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This article  accounts  for the  British  experiment  with  rail privatisation  and  how  it has  worked
out economically  and  politically.  The  focus  is not  simply  on proﬁtability  and  public  subsidy,
but  on the  appearances  which  accounting  arrangements  create.  The  article  scrutinises  the
Network  Rail  subsidy  regime,  which  enables  train  operators  to  achieve  ﬁctitious  proﬁtabil-
ity without  increased  direct  state  support.  This  enables  supporters  of privatisation  to  claim
train  operators  produce  a net  gain  for the  British  taxpayer.  The  claim  forms  the  heart  of
a trade  narrative  which  is employed  by  the  industry  and  their political  backers  to  deﬂect
criticism  and  stymy  reform.
©  2014  Elsevier  Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
This article accounts for the British experiment with rail privatisation and how it has worked out economically and
olitically. The objective is to create a more complex analysis of the consequences of rail privatisation which focuses not
imply on levels of proﬁtability and public subsidy within the rail system, but on the appearances which these ﬁnancial
rrangements create, and their political consequences. The starting point for this analysis is a paradox between stories of
rilliant success achieved by private train operating companies (TOCs), and a ﬁnancial backdrop of accumulating public
iabilities and complex state subsidy arrangements.
Twenty years after the Railways Act of 1993 which dismantled the integrated state monopoly, British Rail, the political
ponsors of the privatised system are able to make conﬁdent claims about successes achieved. The Conservative Party
ransport Minister Patrick McGloughlin, celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Association of Train
perating Companies (ATOC) – the trade association established by private passenger train operators in 1993 – in July 2013
ith a speech which heralded “20 years of rising investment [and] 20 years of extraordinary growth on our railway”:
And think back to where we started. As a junior transport minister in the 1980s, I remember British Rail. Underin-
vestment in tracks and trains. Poor reliability. Managers whose good ideas were too often stiﬂed by a lack of cash . . .
And an ageing network in a declining industry. John Major – then the Prime Minister – knew things could be better.
So tonight, I’d like to pay tribute to the people who got it right. And those who  over the past 20 years have made it
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happen. Let me  start with some facts. For most of the time since the Second World War  rail trafﬁc has been falling.
Since privatisation, journeys have doubled. The network is roughly the same size as 15 years ago. But there are 4000
more services a day . . . This is the success of privatisation. I could go on reading out ﬁgures (Department for Transport,
2013).
The rhetorical approach employed by ATOC is identical: highlighting past failures allegedly brought about by state
mismanagement and under-ﬁnancing, while using a barrage of statistics to demonstrate “the unprecedented growth and
stunning improvements” since privatisation (ATOC, 2013). Particular emphasis is placed on passenger journey numbers,
which have risen at a rate of just under 4% per-year from 1997 to 2012. This compares favourably to a 60 year average of
0.58% and is well ahead of passenger growth ﬁgures achieved in France, Germany and the Netherlands (Ibid, p. 16–20). These
claims constitute a form of “imaginary” – a discursive construction of what a successful privatised rail system should look
like – that forms the core of the rail sector’s trade narrative.
Attempts to actively manage perceptions about a company, a sector or a national economy have assumed an increasing
prominence in recent decades and coincided with an increased academic focus on the role of economic discourse and
narrative in shaping economic life (Miller & Rose, 1990; Callon, 1998; Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2006). Within this ﬁeld
of study, trade narratives are not a technical language of expertise but simple and easily repeatable stories created by industry
associations and lobbying groups, which differ across sectors but share common devices. Trade narratives serve to defend
sectoral interests without appearing to favour the interests of particular companies. They do so through strong selective
emphasis on positive attributes while occluding or explaining away negatives (Bowman et al., 2013a, p. 6). When successful,
trade narratives ventriloquise journalists and front-bench politicians, creating an echo-chamber where decontextualised
statistics and supportive assertions repeat themselves to frame public debate. Perhaps the most prominent case in British
public life of trade narrative in practise has been the ﬁnancial services industry. Lobbyists for and supporters of London
ﬁnance in the pre-crisis period pushed a narrative which explained the beneﬁcence of ﬁnancial innovation and the need
for light touch regulation which was endlessly repeated and politically endorsed. In the post-crisis period the City’s trade
narrative switched to emphasise its tax and employment contribution in order to ward off reform (Froud, Nilsson, Moran,
& Williams, 2012). In the case of rail, the trade narrative has attempted to counteract criticisms of privatisation through
selective emphasis of speciﬁc performance metrics which endorse claims of success, speciﬁcally rising passenger numbers,
falling direct public subsidy and slim net proﬁt margins (Bowman et al., 2013a). However, if the framing of economic data
is the process by which a trade narrative is corroborated, it is also the area in which it is vulnerable and can be undermined
by events.
In case of rail, the trade narrative is particularly vulnerable because while data on passenger numbers supports one story
of success delivered by private enterprise, the accounts of Network Rail – the company responsible for railway infrastructure
after the collapse of Railtrack PLC in 2001 – tell a different story about state subvention for the railway system on an even
greater scale than under British Rail. McGloughlin’s speech and ATOC’s ﬂagship report released the same month (ATOC, 2013)
do not mention the signiﬁcant growth in the debt burden shouldered by Network Rail to fund infrastructure improvements –
from just under £9636m in 2002/2003 (Network Rail’s ﬁrst full year of operations), to £30,358m as of March 2012 (Network
Rail, 2003, 2013). Over this period, the annual cost of interest payments on this debt ﬁnancing increased almost seven fold to
just under £1.4bn in 2012, surpassing spending on track maintenance which fell below £1bn that same year (Ibid, Network
Rail, 2012).
While nominally a ‘private’ company Network Rail’s ﬁnancial viability has depended on government guarantees to under-
write its bonds. This had the impact of reducing borrowing costs because Network Rail was essentially able to borrow at a risk
free rate with Government guarantees. Moreover, alongside the group of companies that make up Britain’s privatised rail
transportation system, Network Rail has also received signiﬁcant additional state subsidies (Ibid, Jupe, 2009). In recognition
of this, the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) issued an announcement in December 2013 stating that Network Rail would
be reclassiﬁed as a “Central Government body”. This has the effect of bringing over £30bn of additional debt onto the gov-
ernment balance sheet (Joloza, 2013). The ONS’s decision was  required to bring the UK’s national accounting systems in line
with the rest of Europe. However, the implications for the UK rail sector are profound, raising questions about whether the
rail system can be considered privatised in any meaningful sense. Indeed, in April 2014, the Debt Management Ofﬁce – the
Treasury agency responsible for managing cash and debt on behalf of the UK government – went a step further. It announced
that: “Government has now determined that, in future, value for money for the taxpayer will best be secured by Network
Rail borrowing directly from the Government, rather than by Network Rail issuing debt in its own name” (Debt Management
Ofﬁce, 2014, p. 1). This effectively ended direct private sector involvement in ﬁnancing Britain’s rail infrastructure.
This article questions what is going on here economically and politically. From an economic and ﬁnancial perspective,
much appears to have gone wrong with rail privatisation. However, the political narratives from the sector and senior
politicians are about privatisation working well and delivering on its promises. This article employs accounting numbers
to critique the political rhetoric surrounding the privatisation of Britain’s railways. To begin with, the article argues, it is
necessary to understand that rail privatisation, is a mess born out of efforts to relieve long-term problems with cost recovery
and under-funding. As the subsequent analysis explains, this economic confusion also has political consequences.
The ﬁrst section of the article takes a historical perspective on railway ﬁnances under nationalised and private ownership,
highlighting, in Gourvish’s terms (2002, p. 2), the “deep-seated confusion about what the railways were actually supposed to
achieve in a mixed economy”. Privatisation in the early 1990s was intended to secure ﬁnancial sustainability through private
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nvestment and increased operating efﬁciency, but the reforms ignored historical problems with a capital intensive industry
here passenger fare revenue was rarely sufﬁcient to recover the costs of investment (Shaoul, 2007). The second section of
he article shows that this contradiction was played out through the ﬁnancing of rail infrastructure. After the 2001 ﬁnancial
ollapse of Railtrack, the PLC responsible for rail infrastructure from privatisation in 1994, Network Rail, its successor,
as established to increase state-supported infrastructure while maintaining private ownership (Whitehouse, 2003; Jupe,
009a). An outcome of the hurried policy making process leading to the establishment of Network Rail was a re-worked
ubsidy system that has enabled train operating companies (TOCs), which run passenger franchise services allocated through
ompetitive bidding processes, to achieve ﬁctitious proﬁtability without increased direct state subsidy. The increased public
ubsidy channelled through Network Rail enabled track access charges (TACs) (the single major operating revenue source for
ailtrack and Network Rail, paid by the TOCs) to be lowered alongside a massive programme of upgrades and maintenance.
Several other studies have noted the extent to which proﬁt-making in the UK’s privatised rail system has been dependent
n various forms of public subsidy (e.g. Jupe, 2009; Shaoul, 2006; Stittle, 2002; Taylor & Slomann, 2012). This paper attempts
o build on these studies in the third section ﬁrst by presenting additional data which demonstrates the heavy indirect subsidy
o the TOCs via Network Rail, and secondly by developing a new line of analysis on the signiﬁcance of these funding ﬂows
or the politics of privatised rail—speciﬁcally, that they facilitate a trade narrative about operating successes and allow
upporters of rail privatisation to claim that TOCs produce a net gain for the taxpayer. As the ﬁnal section of the paper
rgues, the trade narrative is lent credibility and support by senior politicians because the backers of rail privatisation are
o-dependent upon the train operators in upholding the appearance of success delivered by private enterprise.
. The contradictions of rail privatisation: Promises and historical realities
Since the birth of the British railway network in the UK in the mid-19th century, matters of access, ownership, and
tandards have been a source of recurring controversy, but the underlying driver of periodic reform over the past 50 has
een the issue of costs: how to meet the expense of a capital intensive industry which produces diffuse social and economic
eneﬁts, but cannot recover costs from passengers without pricing much of the population off the railways. The logic of
ationalisation in 1945 was that British Rail, as with other strategic nationalised industries, would provide a cheap service
or the rest of the productive economy, with operating losses tolerated because proﬁt was not a privileged indicator of
erformance.
This logic never sat easily with the Treasury. After having peaked in 1952, post-war rail operating surpluses vanished (Loft,
001, pp. 72–73). In 1956, the new Transport Minister, Harold Watkinson, in sympathy with the Treasury view, pledged
o ‘turn the railways away from being just another nationalised industry into an organisation that functions on normal
nd sensible business lines’ (Ibid, p. 76). The 1961 White Paper, The Economic and Financial Obligations of the Nationalised
ndustries, introduced ﬁnancial targets for state owned enterprises (Chick, 2002, p. 135–137), and within this frame railways
ere not a utility providing cheap services but an uneconomic industry charging artiﬁcial prices (Loft, 2001, p. 86). The
eeching cuts of 1963–5 closed 2363 stations and 266 services – roughly one third of the rail network – and were a drastic
ttempt to shape the rail network around cost recovery and reduced losses. As Beeching’s report, The Reshaping of British
ailways, stated:
The railways emerged from the war at a fairly high level of activity, but in a poor physical state. They were able to
pay their way, because road transport facilities were still limited, and they continued to do so until 1952. From then
onwards, however, the surplus on operating account declined progressively. After 1953 it became too small to meet
capital charges, after 1955 it disappeared, and by I960 the annual loss on operating account had risen to £67m (British
Railways Board, 1963, p. 3).
British Rail’s losses proved a stubborn problem because successive governments’ promotion of motorways cut passenger
umbers and increased British rail deﬁcits in the early 1970s. The 1974 Railways Act imposed targets aimed at stabilising
tate subsidy while restricting external ﬁnancing (Gourvish, 1990, pp. 120–121). A further White Paper on the Nationalised
ndustries in 1978 paved the way for stricter ﬁnancial targets and more complex performance indicators, producing what
eter Parker, then British Rail chairman, described as a state of ‘perpetual audit’ (Gourvish, 2002, p. 44). These successive
eform efforts obscured what Gourvish (2002) describes as:
. . . [D]eep-seated confusion about what the railways were actually supposed to achieve in a mixed economy . . . from
the beginning the politicians attempted to produce an entity which could combine public service aspirations and
commercial viability, but after 25 years’ experience this search was something of a Holy Grail. (Gourvish, 2002, p. 2)
The Thatcher government intensiﬁed commercial pressures. Targets for subsidy reductions amounted in real terms to
 25% cut between 1983 and 1986 (Ibid, p. 122). However, in a period of strong economic growth in the mid-1980s, all
hree passenger businesses increased their incomes, with an aggregate growth in real passenger income of 36% between
983 and 1989 (Gourvish, 1990, p. 130). By the early 1990s the network was investment-starved but effective at controlling
osts. In 1989, British Rail was recorded as being 40% more efﬁcient than eight comparable rail systems in Europe used as
enchmarks, whereas in 1979, it was no more than 14% more efﬁcient (Ibid: 149).
In the hurry to implement privatisation in the 1990s, the government did not acknowledge the railways’ long-term
roblems about recovering costs from fares. The 1993 Railways Act introduced a disintegrated, tripartite structure: a stock
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%Fig. 1. Passenger revenue as a percentage of total rail system revenue. Sources: Ofﬁce for Rail regulator (ORR) and SN/SG/617, House of Commons Note: Total
passenger rail fares as a share of total revenues received.
market listed PLC (Railtrack) responsible for infrastructure, train operating companies (TOCs) bidding for franchises to run
passenger services, with rolling stock (engines and carriages) leased from rolling stock operating companies (ROSCOs). The
July 1992 White Paper, New Opportunities for the Railways, justiﬁed the system with a series of assumptions and promises
which still form the basis for the imaginary of successful rail privatisation (Secretary of State for Transport, 1992). Alongside
expectations of ‘less scope and justiﬁcation for government involvement’; ‘Clear and enforceable quality standards’; ‘greater
opportunities to cut out waste and otherwise reduce costs, without sacriﬁcing quality’, the principle claim was that privatised
railways would attract large-scale private investment, allowing modernisation of a kind which British Rail could never
manage (Ibid). As Shaoul (2007) noted, this imaginary ignored the:
. . . [P]articular circumstances of a capital intensive industry such as the railways. The source of the problem was
not simply competition, regulation or its lack, but more importantly the insufﬁcient surplus created by the industry
relative to the amount of capital invested in the industry, to meet all the claims consequent upon privatization. (Shaoul,
2007, p. 211)
The Prime Minister at the time, John Major, did not discuss rail privatisation in his autobiography but when asked in 2008
to justify the policy his only positive argument was that rail privatisation would draw in investment because ‘in the future
– as in the past – no Government would ever provide the railways with adequate funding’ (: Loc: 6594). Such expectations
have proven misguided. Public funding did not disappear, but rather increased to be consistently higher in real terms in the
2000s than in the decade before privatisation, from £3718m in 1992/1993 to nearly £7415m in 2006/2007 (Appendix A).
Fig. 1 also provides a long term view on the percentage of total rail system revenue accounted for by passenger revenue—that
is, the revenue earned from the rail companies from their operating activities. In the 25 years covered by the available data,
it is signiﬁcant to note that passenger revenue never accounted for more than 85% of total rail revenue (Appendix A) and
averaged just 60 percent of total income during this period (see Table 1).
The British rail network has never at any point in recent history managed to cover its costs from passenger fares. Gov-
ernment in recent years has reportedly set a target of recovering 75% of costs from passengers, a ﬁgure achieved only once
since privatisation (BBC, 2013). Ticket prices under both public and private ownership have been subject to regulation in
an effort to balance public accessibility with ﬁnancial objectives, and bringing fare revenues in line with costs would risk
Table 1
Real passenger revenues and government grants.
Years Total passenger
revenue
Total state support to the rail industry
inc PTE grants (excluding freight)
Total passenger revenue
and total state grants
Passenger revenue as a share of
passenger revenue and total state grants
£bn £bn £bn %
1986 to 2012 125 85 209 60
Sources: ORR and SN/SG/617, House of Commons. Notes: Subsidy: 2001/02–2003/2004 includes £3.520bn government grants directly to Railtrack/Network
Rail  and London & Continental Railways. Including non-franchised passenger revenue (£36.7 in 2009/2010 and £45.5 in 2010/2011) Passenger revenue
includes all ticket revenue.
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eopardising the former objective. Under public ownership, this gap between passenger revenue and total revenue indicated
anagement failure. Under private ownership the matter has been more complex. While the privatised rail system has
enerated a number of proﬁtable positions for companies within it, this has ultimately relied upon the cost of infrastructure
eing passed to the state.
.1. Reconﬁguring rail subsidies: Railtrack, Network Rail and ‘Fixing the Finances’
The problems with cost recovery and infrastructure ﬁnancing under privatisation have been met  with a series of bodges
nd ﬁxes relating to the ﬂow of state subsidy around the rail system. The original 1992 White Paper on rail privatisation
ecommended rail infrastructure should remain publicly owned because there was  no historical record of proﬁtability.
owever, the expectation was that private sector management expertise coupled with capital market disciplines could
nancially transform some aspects of the rail system, and the decision was made to privatise Railtrack, which was  formed in
pril 1994 and ﬂoated two years later in May  1996. Railtrack’s source of income was the Track Access Charges (TACs) levied
n the TOCs. These were set by the Ofﬁce of the Rail Regulator (reformed and renamed as the Ofﬁce of Rail Regulation from
uly 2004) for ﬁve year Control Periods. The charges were determined by the Regulator to cover operating costs, subject to
fﬁciency savings, current cost depreciation, and provide a stable return on capital over a Regulated Asset Base sufﬁcient to
ersuade shareholders of the merits of new investment (Stittle, 2002, pp. 150–151; Jupe, 2009, p. 183). Prior to 2000, it was
xpected that TACs would enable Railtrack to run without a public subsidy. However, TOCs were not able to meet the cost of
he charges through passenger revenues, and so they were underwritten by state support which peaked at £2.5bn in 1997
the ﬁrst full year under a fully privatised system), but remained over £1bn by 2001 (see Appendix B). This direct subsidy for
he TOCs was also therefore an indirect subsidy for Railtrack, which was able to distribute regular dividends to shareholders
hrough the 1990s (Jupe, 2007, p. 149). Indeed, during Railtrack’s existence between 1994/1995 and 2001/2002, subsidies to
he TOCs averaged 92% of the value of Railtrack’s TAC revenue (Appendix B). After 2000, the regulator added direct subsidies
o Railtrack’s revenue mix  (Crompton & Jupe, 2007, p. 911).
The ﬂaws in the Railtrack business model were exposed by a succession of fatal rail accidents at Southall in 1997, Ladbroke
rove in 1999, Hatﬁeld in 2000, and Potter’s Bar in 2002. Subsequent ofﬁcial inquiries exposed serious underinvestment in
rack and signalling, and an aggressive outsourcing strategy which raised the real-terms costs of new investment projects
o 2–3 times the levels paid by British Rail (National Audit Ofﬁce, 2000; Crompton & Jupe, 2007, p. 910; Jupe, 2007, p. 150).
he complexity created by these outsourcing arrangements, the absence of a British Rail-style asset register, and the loss of
xperienced senior staff in the cost-cutting drive, meant Railtrack was unable to provide concrete assurances over the safety
f the rail network. Reduced speed limits were imposed around the country, incurring ﬁnes for Railtrack as compensation to
OCs, pushing passengers to other forms of transport and causing an industry-wide ﬁnancial crisis (Crompton & Jupe, 2007,
. 914; Jupe, 2007, p. 150). Combined with recognition of the scale of spending required to replace and renew infrastructure,
hese ﬁnancial strains led government to intervene. The sharp rise in state subsidy from 2001 in Fig. 1 reﬂects the extent to
hich the state took on responsibility for funding the urgent infrastructure track and replacements. In 2001, its ﬁnal full year
f operation, Railtrack secured a £1.5bn government grant and proposed paying shareholders £138m in dividends while
aking a pre-tax loss of £534m (Railtrack Group PLC, 2001).
The New Labour government decided in late 2001, after further requests from Railtrack for ﬁnancial support, that fun-
amental reform was required. However, it shied away from its pre-1997 election promise to renationalise the railways.
aving put Railtrack into administration in October 2001, it instead took a Third Way-inspired decision to create, in October
002, a new “not-for-dividend” infrastructure company, Network Rail (Whitehouse, 2003). In legal terms, the company was
rivate and ‘owned’ by members (drawn from industry and other stakeholder organisations) who were intended to act like
hareholders (Jupe, 2007, p. 253). However, government could appoint a director, and exert control through regulation, with
he Ofﬁce for Rail Regulation (ORR’s) targets for Control Periods agreed by the Transport Minister, and ﬁnancial support (Ibid,
. 254). Rather than sourcing capital from equity markets, Network Rail was to issue bonds with repayment guaranteed by
he Treasury, making its ﬁnancing costs similar to those of gilt yields. Despite this arrangement its debt appeared, until 2014,
s a private sector liability rather than in the public sector debt ﬁgures in the national accounts. The ONS initially accepted
he argument that it was a contingent liability for government that was unlikely to be called (Crompton & Jupe, 2007, p. 914).
he matter caused considerable disagreement though, with the National Audit Ofﬁce arguing the debt should be formally
onsidered a public liability (McCartney & Stittle, 2006, p. 149).
The formation of Network Rail brought with it increased commitments for public funding of the railways. As the ORR
xplained (2003, p. 7):
. . . the Regulator has concluded that it is appropriate to allow for Network Rail to spend signiﬁcantly more than
he allowed Railtrack in his October 2000 access charges review, because this will enable Network Rail safely and
effectively to tackle the legacy it inherited from Railtrack: a legacy of poor planning and project delivery; inadequate
arrangements for managing suppliers and subcontractors; inadequate levels of maintenance and renewal activity;
poor customer focus; and an insufﬁcient grasp of the causes of and cures for poor day-to-day performance.
In 2004 the ORR sanctioned a rise of 50% in funding for the 2004–2009 control period (Jupe, 2009, p. 194). Alongside the
ebt guarantee, which lowered borrowing costs and enabled a rapid expansion in balance sheet capitalisation, the growth
n Network Rail spending was further inﬂated by the commencement of major annual grants to Network Rail (see Fig. 2).
56 A. Bowman / Accounting Forum 39 (2015) 51–63Fig. 2. Railtrack and Network Rail share of income by type 1994–2012. Source: Railtrack and Network Rail annual report and accounts, various years. Notes:
Grants includes deferred grants and incentive adjustments.
These grants were made all the more important by the fact that, in real terms, income from regulated TACs fell in the years
after the establishment of Network Rail, despite a growth in passenger kilometres travelled (see Appendix C). Academic
discussion of Network Rail has focused on the quantitative impact of this policy decision on railway ﬁnancing leading, as it
did, to major increases in public rail expenditure. Equally signiﬁcant, this paper argues, is the impact it had on perceptions of
railway ﬁnancing and the role of public subsidy thereof. In rerouting the bulk of direct subsidy away from the TOCs and into
Network Rail, while reducing the burden of TACs, the appearance of railway ﬁnancials was  radically altered. While grants
to the TOCs pre-2001 had formed a vital indirect subsidy for Railtrack proﬁts, post-2002 this situation was reversed so that
government grants to Network Rail became an indirect subsidy for the TOCs. Essentially, this ﬁx allowed the private sector
TOCs to appear more proﬁtable and less burdensome to the taxpayer.
This ﬁnancial arrangement in turn enabled the TOCs to construct narratives extolling the beneﬁts of rail privatisation and
reinforcing claims laid out in the 1992 White Paper. The argument of this paper is therefore that the TOCs have capitalised
on a series of haphazard accounting ﬁxes that have inadvertently served a political rhetoric. The tilt towards a heavier
reliance on the Network Grant and publicly-guaranteed debt, and a lesser reliance on TACs, was the outcome of a process
which began with the Rail Regulator’s 2000 Periodic Review, and ended with the subsequent implementation of a new
charging regime from 2004. The proposals created by Network Rail and the ORR in 2003 at the end of the Periodic Review’s
consultation process recommended scaling down government subsidies and substantially raising TACs. As set out in Table 2,
track access charge revenue under the proposals would rise to £4.1 billion as other grants were discontinued, becoming the
sole source of revenue for Network Rail as was originally intended for Railtrack (ORR, 2003a). The target of £3164m from
TACs in 2004/2005 was more than double the £1256 achieved in 2001/2002 and £1356 in 2002/2003.
These targets were the outcome of 15 months of analysis and consultation, but 10 days before the ORR was  due to publish
them, the Department for Transport informed them that ‘for accounting reasons it would be desirable for the Strategic Rail
Authority (SRA) [the non-departmental planning and regulatory agency established by the Transport Act 2000 and abolished
in 2005] in future to increase the amount of money that it pays in grant to Network Rail allowing access charges to be set
at a lower level’ (ORR, 2003a, p. 11). The accounting rationale was complex. TOCs could claim support from the SRA to pay
Table 2
Proposed Network Rail revenue proﬁle (£m).
Expected track access charges (TAC) revenue Grants from the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) Total Network Rail revenue
£m £m £m
2004/2005 3164 1279 4443
2005/2006 3759 652 4411
2006/2007 3690 552 4242
2007/2008 4199 0 4199
2008/2009 4137 0 4137
Source: ORR.
f
S
t
a
i
T
m
d
O
R
i
£
3
i
o
t
r
t
h
n
p
d
p
t
2
t
T
o
p
f
s
s
d
T
N
e
D
G
T
ﬁA. Bowman / Accounting Forum 39 (2015) 51–63 57
or increases in TACs introduced at new ﬁve year control periods that were not in their franchise agreements. However, the
RA preferred to pay grants to Network Rail rather than the TOCs, as the ORR explained:
[T]he DfT and the SRA explained that allowing the SRA to pay more directly to Network Rail in grant would reduce
the pressure on the SRA’s overall franchise support budget at a time when the cost to the SRA of subsidies paid to
franchise holders had already risen sharply and was  likely to cause the SRA to incur expenditure beyond that which
has been allocated to it (Ibid, p. 11).
The other reason given for channelling public funding through Network Rail was  that it would be counted as capital rather
han current expenditure, a key consideration given then-Chancellor Gordon Brown’s professed focus on ﬁscal prudence as
 central plank of economic policy (Brown, 2001). As the ORR explained:
The accounting rules that governments throughout the European Union must adhere to, do not allow grants to the
private sector to be accounted for as capital formation, unless paid directly to the private sector entity undertaking
the capital formation. Therefore, such grants cannot be routed through the TOCs (ORR, 2008, p. 328).
The then-transport secretary Alistair Darling argued to the House of Commons that the government’s ﬁscal rules prohib-
ted it from borrowing to fund current expenditure, which it would be doing if it gave subsidies to the TOCs to cover higher
ACs. The solution was to ensure subsidy to Network Rail did not exceed its capital investment (renewals and enhance-
ents), while its income from sales (TACs) needed to cover 50% of its production costs (operations and maintenance, plus
epreciation) (ORR, 2003b). Capital grants to Network Rail would thereby not be recorded as current expenditure by the
NS (House of Commons, 2003, 122–124). Fig. 2 displays the ﬁnancial outcomes of the transition from Railtrack to Network
ail. Whereas the former had been 85% ﬁnanced by TACs, Network Rail has received only around one quarter to one third of
ts income from this source. The balance comes principally from government grants, which in 2011/12 amounted to nearly
4bn.
. Fixing proﬁts and managing appearances
McCartney and Stittle (2006, p. 150) conclude over the creation of Network Rail, “The suspicion must be that the unusual,
f not unique structure of Network Rail is a result, not only of some idée ﬁxe about the political implications of extending state
wnership but also concern for the economic reporting implications.” Politically sponsored reforms coupled with oppor-
unistic accounting enabled a dramatic growth in debt ﬁnancing for rail infrastructure without a commensurate increase in
eported government indebtedness. This all came to an end with the ONS’s 2013 decision to bring Network Rail debt onto
he public sector balance sheet (Joloza, 2013; Debt Management Ofﬁce, 2014). However, as this section argues, Network Rail
as continuing political relevance in altering the ﬁnancial appearance of privatised rail in a manner which supports the trade
arratives of TOCs. This is done by artiﬁcially inﬂating TOC proﬁts in a manner which enables them to make larger franchise
ayments back to the taxpayer. This, in turn, provides the TOCs with an important rhetorical opportunity not only in terms of
efending their proﬁtable niche within a loss-making industry but also in maintaining the imaginary of privatisation among
olitical backers of the policy.
As mentioned, a key promise of rail privatisation was the elimination of public subsidy followed by a net gain for the
axpayer in the form of franchise payments levied on the TOCs a state that was  expected to be achieved by 2005/2006 (Shaoul,
006, p. 152; Jupe, 2009, p. 188). Under the Network Rail regime, TACs were lowered as passenger journeys increased and
icket prices rose above the rate of inﬂation. This improved the fortunes of the TOCs to the extent that the Department for
ransport became a net beneﬁciary of rail franchising in 2011/2012. As Fig. 3 shows, net subsidy to TOCs transformed from
ver £1bn at the formation of Network Rail in 2001/2002 to a small net gain for government from 2011 onwards as franchise
ayments made by TOCs exceeded direct subsidies. This has however coincided with large increase in direct state subsidy
or the infrastructure company. Thus, while subsidy to the TOCs as a percentage of passenger revenue has fallen the direct
ubsidy to Network Rail has remained equal to around 50% of passenger revenue (see also Appendix B).
During the ﬁrst decade of Network Rail’s existence, passenger kilometres travelled increased by some 43%, while pas-
enger fare revenue for the TOCs increased by 48%; meanwhile, Network Rail’s revenue from TACs, adjusted for inﬂation,
eclined 12% from £1.8bn to £1.6bn. The effects of this system of indirect subsidy on the ﬁnancial performance of individual
OCs is illustrated by ﬁgures released by the Department for Transport (2012) shown in Table 3. Excluding the effects of the
etwork Grant to Network Rail, only eight of 18 franchises received a net direct subsidy during the year whereby subsidies
xceeded franchise premium payments. However, when including the Network Grant for the 16 franchises for which the
fT lists the value in pence per mile1, 15 are net recipients of government subsidy.
The levels of state support for the TOCs are however greater than they appear in Table 3 because alongside the Network
rant, Network Rail has augmented its operating income by issuing bonds in the capital market with government guarantees.
he result, in terms of capital structure, was a major shift towards debt ﬁnancing. Railtrack was  never less than 50% equity
nanced because it could not issue large amounts of investment grade paper. Network Rail however has been nearly 80%
1 Arrival Trains Wales and First Scotrail fall under the jurisdiction of the Scottish and Welsh devolved governments.
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Fig. 3. Network Rail and TOC subsidy, 1995–2012.  Source: ORR, Network Rail Annual Reports and Accounts. Notes: Network Rail subsidy includes grants
deferred grants and incentive adjustments. Subsidy to TOCs includes grants, franchise payments and performance receipts.
Table 3
Government direct and indirect subsidy for current UK rail franchises 2011/2012.
Net franchise
payments
Net revenue
support
Total direct
government
subsidy to TOCs
Indirect government
subsidy via Network
Rail grants
Total direct and
indirect government
subsidya
Pence per mile Pence per mile Pence per mile Pence per mile Pence per mile
Arriva Trains Wales n/a n/a 19 n/a n/a
C2C  −2 0 −2 7 5
Chiltern Railways 1 0 1 12.4 13.5
CrossCountry −0.6 0.9 0.3 14.7 15
East  Coast −6.2 0 −6.2 6.6 0.5
East  Midlands Trains −4.8 1.9 −3 13.7 10.8
First  Capital Connect −9.1 1.5 −7.6 5.4 −2.2
First  Great Western −8.8 5.8 −3 8.8 5.8
First  Scotrail n/a n/a 18 n/a n/a
First  TransPennine Express 8 0 8 12.1 20.1
Greater Anglia −4.2 0 −4.2 8.1 3.9
London  Midland 5 0 5 10.7 15.8
National Express East Anglia −5.3 1.8 −3.5 8.6 5.1
Northern Rail 8.2 −0.9 7.3 27.6 34.9
Southeastern 1.5 1.9 3.4 9.7 13
Southern −0.6 0 −0.6 7 6.4
South  West Trains −8.8 2.4 −6.4 7.4 0.9
Virgin  Trains −5.7 1.2 −4.5 8.1 3.6Source: DfT/ORR.
a Notes: Direct subsidy’ relates to payments made directly to the TOCS, calculated from the company annual report and accounts and ORR data. ‘Indirect
subsidy’ includes the effects of the government’s Network Grant to Network Rail, which enables the company to charge lower track access charges to the
TOCs.
debt ﬁnanced in recent years, increasing its debt to over £30bn in the space of a decade, consisting mainly of recently issued
long-term debt2. This heavy reliance on debt ﬁnancing will continue as Network Rail implements a planned £38 billion of
capital investment over the next ﬁve years (Department for Transport, 2014). While easing the ﬁnancial stress on the TOCs,
the result of this debt burden is that the rail system as a whole acquired a new stakeholder with ﬁnancial claims that must be
prioritised above cash used for internal re-investment. In 2003–2004, Network Rail’s spending on track maintenance was, at
£1.5bn (adjusted for inﬂation) roughly four times larger than interest paid. The company’s debt has subsequently increased
to the extent that Network Rail in 2011/12 spent signiﬁcantly more on servicing its debt than on maintaining the track, with
£968m on the latter and £1324m on the former (Appendix D). While perhaps not intended as such, the outcome of Network
2 Network Rail’s bank debt and loans in 2003 was  £1.4bn and in 2012 the total was £29.4bn (Source: Annual report and accounts).
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ail’s ﬁnancial arrangements has been the construction of proﬁtability among TOCs which would otherwise have depended
n substantial direct subsidy.
.1. Financial transformation and trade narratives
Rising passenger numbers, increased TOC proﬁts and inﬂated franchise payments to government enabled the TOCs to
rgue that privatisation has been successful and delivered on its promises. The underlying referent for these claims of success
s the model of rail privatisation set out in the 1992 White Paper which formed the basis for subsequent legislation. This
hort document laid out a series of promises about what rail privatisation would achieve. Alongside vague assurances about
ompetition, management freedom and increasing the focus on customers’ needs a signiﬁcant measurable promise was the
eventual) total transfer of costs and ﬁnancial risks to the private sector (Secretary of State for Transport, 1992).
The system of rail privatisation set out in Britain has therefore achieved almost the exact opposite ﬁnancially of the
bjectives set out in the 1992 White Paper. The state has been burdened with the ﬁnancial risks and costs of the rail
nfrastructure. Meanwhile, the system of accounting creates artiﬁcial proﬁtability in an activity that would otherwise be
ntirely uneconomic for the TOCs. The accounting ﬁxes facilitate the paradox whereby the TOCs’ trade association, ATOC,
nd political backers of privatisation are still able to claim that the reforms have delivered “stunning improvements” and
onstitute another “a British success story” (ATOC, 2013). These claims form part of the rail sector’s trade narrative, which
pholds the imaginary of privatisation and shapes public discourse on rail around the interests of the TOCs.
This trade narrative has become increasingly strident over recent years as the franchising model has come under criticism.
his criticism was sparked by high proﬁle failures of two successive franchises on the East Coast Mainline (ECML) after over-
ptimistic bids were accepted by the DfT, and the aborted re-franchising of the West Coast Mainline in 2012 following the
iscovery of errors in the DfT’s assessments of the winning bid (McCartney & Stittle, 2011; Brown, 2013). As well as providing
mmunition for the arguments of anti-privatisation opponents in the British trade union movement, these problems have,
ore signiﬁcantly, led to the opposition Labour Party stating that it would favour allowing a state-owned organisation to
ontinue operating the ECML, or even consider wholesale renationalisation of the system (Pickard & Odell, 2013; Wintour,
013). Opinion polls have also highlighted continued public support for re-nationalisation of rail (e.g. YouGov, 2013).
The trade narrative is propped up by supportive statistics highlighting growth in passenger journeys – a metric which is
eavily inﬂuenced by factors beyond the control of the TOCs – and satisfaction survey scores, which frame choices in narrow
nd depoliticised terms (Bowman et al., 2013b, pp. 110–128). It is also crucially supported by the claim that rail operators
roduce a net gain for the taxpayer and that this beneﬁt has been achieved through competition among private enterprises.
TOC in recent public-relations material claims Franchise Payments to government have risen from £400m in 1997/8 to
1.7bn in 2012/13, as a result of the increased proﬁtability of the rail operators (ATOC, 2013). The organisation states:
The franchising model has enabled train companies to generate signiﬁcant ﬁnancial returns for the Government,
played a crucial role in delivering unprecedented growth in journey numbers, and provided passengers with improved
services and better value (Ibid: 29)
Richard Branson’s defence of Virgin’s West Coast Main Line (WCML) franchise in August 2012 is an apt example of the
arrative in action, touching upon the elimination of state subsidy, and the role of private sector management expertise in
ransforming a failed industry under state ownership:
(Virgin) won the franchise in 1997 with an agenda to change radically the way people viewed and used the train. At
the time the track was run-down, staff demoralised, the service riddled with delays and reliant on heavy subsidies.
We set hugely challenging targets to dramatically speed up journey times with modern tilting trains, increase the
frequency of the service, improve the on-board experience; as well as double passenger numbers and return the line
to proﬁt. We  were told it was ‘Mission Impossible’ and our plans were laughed at by critics. However, 15 years later,
despite continued problems with the track, we  have achieved our targets (Virgin Trains, 2012).
In a subsequent article for The Guardian newspaper defending Virgin’s record on the WCML  claimed the company had
chieved “a big turnaround from the liability we inherited and in that time we and our partners have taken total dividends
f £499m, while the government and the taxpayer have seen a rise in revenues and a massive increase in assets values”
Branson, 2013).
.2. Political co-dependence and the political resilience of privatisation
The political signiﬁcance of the subsidy arrangement described in the preceding sections is reﬂected in the adoption of
he trade narrative by key government ofﬁcials and government ministers, who  are enrolled in – and co-dependent upon
 the appearance of success in rail privatisation. Similar arguments, for example, have been made by transport secretary,
atrick McLoughlin, speaking at a celebration hosted by ATOC for 20 years since the onset of rail privatisation outlined his
ommitment to the model of rail franchising by drawing a dichotomy between past failures under public ownership and
ecent success derived from the entrepreneurial skill of the TOCs:
Franchising might still be criticised by those who  want to turn backwards. Those who  think centralised
control is the future. Those who can’t see the signiﬁcant beneﬁts that private sector operators have
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brought to the railway. Those who haven’t learnt any lessons from the past (Department for Transport,
2013)
The Brown Review of rail franchising (Brown, 2013), commissioned in the wake of the 2012 West Coast Mainline franchis-
ing failure, demonstrates simultaneously the resilience of the rail industry trade narrative and the interconnected interests
of political, state and private sector elites around rail. Instead of a lengthier review of the franchising system carried out
by disinterested parties, the Transport Secretary explicitly tasked Richard Brown, chair of Eurostar and a former chair of
ATOC, to develop recommendations on ‘how to get the other franchise competitions back on track as soon as possible’ (DfT,
2012a). Brown delivered a report front-ended with the statement, ‘I share the Government’s view . . . that the rail industry
works, and that there is no credible case for major structural change . . . It is very important that the franchising programme
is restarted as soon as possible’ (Brown, 2013). This allowed the Transport Secretary Patrick McLoughlin to say, ‘The review
has conﬁrmed that Government’s approach to rail franchising system is still the best way to secure the rail services for tax
payers and fare payers alike’ (DfT, 2013a).
The government’s commitment to maintaining rail franchising in the face of challenges was  further underscored with the
re-franchising process for the East Coast Mainline (ECML) in 2014. We  have already noted that two  successive private sector
operators of the franchise had failed in rapid succession: Great North Eastern Railways in 2007, and National Express East
Coast in 2009 after making what proved to be excessively optimistic estimates of the revenues they would receive and the
franchise payments they could thereby afford (McCartney & Stittle, 2011). As a result the UK Government took over the ECML
franchise through Directly Operated Rail (DOR). During difﬁcult economic circumstances, and with one of the oldest rolling
stock ﬂeets of any operator in the country, DOR performed creditably, using less subsidy than any of the privately-controlled
franchises, returning £208m to the taxpayer in premium payments and dividends, and achieving the highest ever Passenger
Focus satisfaction score for the ECML in the 2012/13 ﬁnancial year (Directly Operated Rail, 2013). These successes led to
calls from the Labour opposition and the trade unions to maintain DOR’s control of the franchise to serve as a benchmark
for private sector-controlled franchises, or allow it to compete with private sector operators in a re-franchising process
(Topham, 2013). The government’s response was to push the re-franchising process for the ECML forward to enable it to
take place before the 2015 general election and forbidding DOR from competing in the bidding process (Topham, 2014).
Announcing the decision to the House of Commons in March 2013, Transport Secretary Patrick Mcgloughlin stated that
success on Britain’s railways in terms of growth in passenger numbers:
. . . hasn’t been achieved despite privatisation. It has been achieved because of privatisation . . . for the money that
passengers and taxpayers put in we should expect. . .ambition. . .innovation.  . .and even better performance for pas-
sengers. And this [franchising] is the way to get it (DfT, 2013b).
It is difﬁcult to imagine that these claims about success from Brown, McGloughlin, Branson and ATOC could be made with
as much force and conﬁdence were the TOCs to still be in receipt of signiﬁcant direct public subsidies required to pay Network
Rail’s full costs. In this scenario, the TOCs would be unable to be portrayed as efﬁcient enterprises achieving independent
success. The role of accounting in terms of disguising and displacing income, costs, capitalisations and risk is used to support
the political narratives that in turn generate the appearance of a successfully privatised utility. Deconstructing the ﬁnancial
numbers and following the money reveals the discrepancy between promises and outcomes. This paper therefore underlines
how accounting systems can be implicated in the process of appearance management by policy and industry elites.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This article has argued that the British rail industry can barely be called privatised in a meaningful sense any longer,
because of the extensive subsidies provided for infrastructure provision and, from 2014, the formal re-designation of Network
Rail debt as a public liability. However, the manner in which subsidies have been channelled through Network Rail has
allowed backers of privatisation among the train operators and the political elites to maintain their narratives about the
promise and outcomes of privatisation. This is because the accounting numbers and their presentation are malleable and
implicated in the attempts to create a favourable image of the privatised rail industry. The purpose of this paper has been
to deconstruct these numbers and identify how reforms displace and alter the presentation of ﬁnancial information over
time. This paper therefore suggests that accounting and critical accountants have a role to play in challenging the political
narratives about transformation in privatised utilities such as rail.
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ppendix A.
Real passenger revenues and government grants
Total passenger
revenue
Total state support to the rail industry
inc PTE grants (excluding freight)
Total passenger revenue
and total state grants
Passenger revenue as a share of
passenger revenue and total state grants
£mill. £mill. £mill. %
1986/1987 3441 2020 5461 63.0
1987/1988 3688 1394 5081 72.6
1988/1989 3803 941 4743 80.2
1989/1990 3673 1531 5204 70.6
1990/1991 3741 2168 5909 63.3
1991/1992 3713 2778 6491 57.2
1992/1993 3718 3748 7466 49.8
1993/1994 3697 2743 6440 57.4
1994/1995 3536 2764 6300 56.1
1995/1996 3784 686 4470 84.7
1996/1997 3970 1629 5599 70.9
1997/1998 4209 2729 6938 60.7
1998/1999 4541 2331 6872 66.1
1999/2000 4807 2024 6830 70.4
2000/2001 4786 1702 6488 73.8
2001/2002 4891 2517 7408 66.0
2002/2003 4907 3467 8374 58.6
2003/2004 5061 4711 9772 51.8
2004/2005 5261 4796 10,057 52.3
2005/2006 5508 5642 11,150 49.4
2006/2007 5891 7415 13,306 44.3
2007/2008 6278 5982 12,261 51.2
2008/2009 6865 5921 12,787 53.7
2009/2010 6750 5016 11,766 57.4
2010/2011 6881 4088 10,968 62.7
2011/2012 7273 3901 11,174 65.1
ources: ORR and SN/SG/617, House of Commons. Notes: Subsidy: 2001/2002–2003/2004 includes £3.520bn government grants directly to Rail-
rack/Network Rail and London & Continental Railways. Including non-franchised passenger revenue (£36.7 in 2009/2010 and £45.5 in 2010/2011)
assenger revenue includes all ticket revenue and miscellaneous charges associated with passenger travel on national railways, e.g. car parking charges.
or  tickets involving travel on London Transport, receipts have been apportioned. Passenger revenue does not include government support or grants.
ppendix B.
Government  subsidy  for  Train  Operating  Companies  and  Network  Rail  (£m, 2012  prices)
Net central  government
revenue  support  grants
for  Train  Operating
Companies
Network
Rail grant
income
Network  Rail/Railtrack
income  from  Track  Access
Charges  paid  by  Train
operating  Companies
TOC
passenger
revenue
TOC subsidy  as
%  of  passenger
revenue
Network  Rail
subsidy  as  %  of
TOC  passenger
revenue
Train  Operating
Company  direct
subsidy  as  %  of  Track
access  charges
£m  £m  £m  £m  %  %  %
1995  2589  0  1955  3536  73  0  132
1996  2383  0  2003  3784  63  0  119
1997  2473  0  2119  3970  62  0  117
1998  1923  0  2131  4209  46  0  90
1999  1589  0  2169  4541  35  0  73
2000  1359  0  2175  4807  28  0  62
2001  1103  0  2089  4786  23  0  53
2002  940  2818  1256  4891  19  58  75
2003  1186  2506  1356  4907  24  51  87
2004  1701  2622  1581  5061  34  52  108
2005  1077  2604  1043  5261  20  49  103
2006  1054  2431  1122  5508  19  44  94
2007  1705  3793  1855  5891  29  64  92
2008  1269  3711  1968  6278  20  59  65
2009  302  4564  1458  6865  4  66  21
2010  500  4051  1501  6750  7  60  33
2011  −52  3901  1603  6881  −1  57  −3
2012  −133  3989  1593  7273  −2  55  −8
ource: ORR, Network Rail. Notes: Network Rail grant income includes grants deferred grants and incentive adjustments. Subsidy to TOCs includes grants,
ranchise payments and performance receipts.
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Appendix C.
Franchise passenger km travelled, compared to Network Rail revenue and TOC passenger revenue (all £m adjusted to 2012 prices)
Franchised passenger
kilometres travelled
Network Rail revenue from
track access charges
TOC revenue from
passenger fares
km  £m £m
2003 39,678 1817 4907
2004  40,906 2056 5061
2005  41,705 1320 5261
2006  43,146 1376 5508
2007  46,154 2180 5891
2008  48,930 2224 6278
2009  50,613 1656 6865
2010  51,101 1630 6750
2011  54,074 1655 6881
2012  56,900 1593 7273
%  Increase, 2003–2012 43 −12 48
Source: Regulatory accounts and ORR National Rail Trends.
Appendix D.
Network Rail spending on infrastructure compared to net interest paid (£m,  2012 prices)
Spending on maintenance Net interest paid
£m £m
2003 1502 256
2004 1763 548
2005 1559 899
2006 1429 1133
2007 1342 1193
2008 1264 1250
2009 1274 1126
2010 1147 1134
2011 1095 1460
2012 968 1324
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